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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Kentucky, the recent judicial attitude has been to protect the surface
from destruction. In the future, legislation will likely recognize these
common law rights. Many states have already enacted strip mine reclama-
tion acts that require the mineral owner to restore the surface to its
natural state. Ultimately, the common law rights of surface preservation
will probably be replaced by legislation -with stringent regulations and
strict enforcement to protect the surface estate.
KENNETH 0. MCCUTCHEON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PREJUDGMENT REPLEVIN
AS A CONTRAVENTION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial enterprise is currently being subjected to a multiphased
attack launched under the auspices of consumer protection. An integral
part of this attack involves a challenge to allegedly unconscionable creditor
practices, particularly those that are widespread among low-income con-
sumers. Bureaucratic investigations' and federal statutes2 have sought to
reduce the uninformed use of credit sales transactions by exposing exor-
bitant finance charges. Several consumer advocates suggest the need for
legislation abolishing the holder in due course doctrine.3 And in the courts,
several traditional creditor's remedies have recently been attacked under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
A particular target of attack under the due process clause has been
prejudgment replevin, which is a favorite creditor's remedy because it
provides a quick, inexpensive means of repossessing property from a debtor
who is allegedly in default. This comment will explore recent judicial de-
velopments that limit the use of prejudgment replevin as a creditor's
remedy. It will then point out some situations in which a creditor may still
be able to use prejudgment replevin and some other means that a creditor
may use to accomplish nearly the same purpose. In addition, this comment
will examine Missouri's codified replevin in the light of the recent case law.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR MODERN STATUTORY REPLEVIN
Replevin is an ancient remedy, yet its modem statutory forms are a
combination of two common law actions-replevin and detinue. The former
developed in 12th-century England from the plea de vetito namio,4 which
had developed as a means of recourse for tenants who had fallen victim
to a wrongful distress by their overlord. Distress was an overlord's common
1. See FEDERAL TRADE COmAMN, ECONOMIc REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT
AND RErAIL SALES PRACTICEs oF Disicr oF COLUmmA RErILERS (1968) [here-
inafter cited as FTC REPORT].
2. See Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-07 (1970).
3. For examples of such curative legislation see N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §
403 (McKinney 1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615 (1965).
4. See 3 W. HoLDSwoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 283 (5d ed. 1927).
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law right to appropriate his tenant's personal property, usually cattle, to
compel satisfaction of arrearages in rent.5 This arrangement entitled a
creditor to retain the seized property until either satisfaction of the debt
or an offer of gage or pledge.6 The right to distress by self-help eventually
became an instrument of oppression, however. The overlord often seized
too much property, misused and damaged seized property, or refused to
redeliver the property upon the tenant's offer of satisfaction.7 If the over-
lord refused to accept gage or pledge, the tenant could plead de vetito namio
to the sheriff. After the tenant supplied appropriate security, the sheriff
would seize the property for immediate delivery to the tenant.8
Two aspects of ancient replevin are noteworthy. First, early replevin
was a debtor's protective remedy, as compared to its present status as a
creditor's weapon. Second, most authorities maintain that replevin was
originally available only for recovery of wrongfully taken chattels, and not
for chattels merely wrongfully detained. 9 Yet, in many cases the creditor
had a right to seize the property, and the tenant could obtain redelivery
only after an offer in satisfaction of his debt. Thus, the distrainor may
only have been guilty of a wrongful detention in some of the early cases.
Later, however, as the action developed as an inexpensive means of trying
title to land,'0 both a wrongful taking and a wrongful detention became
necessary elements of replevin.
Detinue, the other ancestor of modem replevin, is itself a progeny of
the action of debt.11 One of the earliest recognized forms of personal action
in England, debt was designed to secure plaintiff "his due," whether in the
form of money or chattels. The gravamen of detinue was a wrongful deten-
tion; thus, detinue was commonly the remedy of a bailor against his bailee,
i.e., where the defendant had acquired a chattel with plaintiff's consent. 12
Unlike a plaintiff in replevin, a plaintiff in detinue was unable to gain
prejudgment repossession of the chattel. In fact, the law developed to the
extent that the defendant could elect between restoring the chattel or
merely paying its price.' 3
A modem-day creditor seeking prejudgment repossession would find
the separate common law remedies of replevin and detinue useless. Al-
5. See 10 HATSBuRY'S LAws oF ENGLAND 439 (2d ed. 1933).
6. J. COBBEY, LAW OF REPLEVIN 21 (2d ed. 1900).
7. See Crocker v. Mann, 3 Mo. 472 (1834).
8. See 2 F. POLLACK & F. MArILAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 577
(2d ed. 1898). Strong policies militated against wrongful distress, and an over-
lord retaining property after an offer of satisfaction was subject to criminal
prosecution. Bracton indicated the offense was as serious as robbery. Id.
9. See J. COBBEY, supra note 6, at 30.
10. Rather than utilize an expensive in rem action, a plaintiff could sue
another daimant of the land in replevin, alleging that the defendant had tres-
passed upon his property, wrongfully seized his personalty, and thereafter re-
fused its return. Litigation of the wrongful taking issue entailed a determina-
tion of title to the land as between plaintiff and defendant. A. GULLIVER, CAsEs
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FuTURE INTEREsTs 210 (1959).






Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
though replevin seemed to permit prejudgment repossession, it was unavail-
able to the creditor because it required a wrongful taking. Detinue, which
required only a wrongful detention, was available, but it lacked tie pre-
judgment repossession feature. Therefore, from the creditor's standpoint,
a need existed for a remedy with the features of both common law detinue
and common law replevin. The states have fulfilled this need by statute.14
III. STATUTORY REPLEVIN IN MISSOURI
Early Missouri lawmakers struggled with the problems of whether to
combine replevin and detinue and whether to allow a prejudgment -emedy
in both cases. The legislature apparently consolidated the two actions in
an 1816 statute,15 which was repealed two years later. Its replacement al-
lowed prejudgment seizure only in the event of a wrongful taking.10
However, the Missouri Supreme Court construed a subsequent statute,
which arguably retained the distinction between replevin and detinue,' 7
14. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes providing for
prejudgment replevin. See 40 TENN. L. REv. 125, 127 n.8 (1972).
15. Ch. 149, §§ 1, 4, RSMo 1824 provided:
In all cases where there shall be an actual taking of property,
whether such a taking does amount to a trespass or not, it shall be
lawful for any plaintiff to bring his action of replevin therefore.
And in all cases of replevin under this act, when the taking of prop-
erty would not be a tortious taking, the plaintiff . . . shall also
file an affidavit that he verily believes that the property mentioned
in the declaration is his property.
16. §§ 1, 6, at 500, RSMo 1825 provided:
The plaintiff shall file in the office of the clerk of the proper court,
an affidavit stating that he was lawfully possessed of the property
in the declaration mentioned, and that the same was unlawfully
taken . . . and without his consent, within one year next preceding
his application for such writ.
In all declarations of detinue, where the plaintiff shall file in the
office of the clerk of the proper court, an affidavit stating that the
property in the declaration mentioned is his property, and that he is
lawfully entitled to the possession thereof, and the value thereof, and
that defendant unlawfuly detains the same, the clerk shall issue a
writ of capias in detinue, and endorse thereon the amount so sworn
to, and direct the sheriff to take bail of the defendant in double that
sum and it shall be the duty of the sheriff to whom such writ may be
directed, to take a bond of such defendant to the plaintiff with suf-
ficient securities in double the sum so sworn to, conditioned that he
be and appear at the term of the court to which the writ is returnable,
and then and there to defend and make good his claim to the property
in the declaration mentioned, and that if judgment shall be given
against him, at that or any subsequent term, he will deliver to the
plaintiff the property for which judgment shall be given.
17. Ch. 4, § 1, RSMo 1825 provided:
Before any writ of replevin shall be issued, the plaintiff shall file in
the office of the clerk of the proper court an affidavit, stating that
he was lawfuly possessed of the property . . . . and that the same was
unlawfully taken from his possession, and without his consent, within
one year next preceding his application for such writ, and that he is
lawfully entitled to possession thereof.
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as providing that no allegation of wrongful taking was necessary to obtain
the prejudgment remedy18 Our current statute's ancestor, enacted in 1845,
again consolidated the two actions.19
While their provisions are basically parallel, the Revised Statutes of
Missouri now have separate sections for replevin in magistrate court 20
and circuit court.21 In addition, the provisions governing only circuit court
replevin appear to have been enacted in rule 99 of the Missouri Supreme
Court Rules.22
In either court, a plaintiff seeking prejudgment restoration of a chattel
in a replevin suit must file his petition and execute an affidavit contain-
ing the following allegations:
1. He is lawfully entitled to possession, or is the owner of the chattel;
2. the chattel is wrongfully detained;
3. the actual value of the chattel;
4. the chattel is not seized under any process, execution, or attachment
against the plaintiff; and
5. he will be in danger of losing the property unless it is removed
from defendant's possession or otherwise secured.23
To obtain the prejudgment remedy, plaintiff need only swear to the alle-
gations; the statute does not require him to produce independent proof of
their truth.
Upon plaintiff's filing of the affidavit and delivery of a bond in
double the value of the chattel,24 the clerk or judge orders the defendant
to make delivery of the property.2 5 If the defendant fails to deliver the
property, the .clerk or judge will order the sheriff to seize it.26 Defendant
often may rebond in double the value of the chattel to prevent the pre-
judgment repossession. If, however, plaintiff states in the affidavit that
his right of action accrued within one year and that the property was
wrongfully taken, a rebond by defendant cannot defeat plaintiff's right to
repossess the property pending judgment. 27
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Due Process
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive
18. See Crocker v. Mann, 3 Mo. 472 (1834). But see Skinner v. Stouse, 4
Mo. 93 (1835).
19. See ch. 145, §§ 1-15, RSMo 1845.
20. See §§ 533.240-.450, RSMo 1969.
21. See §§ 533.010-.230, RSMo 1969.
22. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.01-.22. Rule 99 may be expanded in the future
to cover replevin in magistrate as well as circuit court.
23. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.01 (circuit court); § 533.260, RSMo 1969 (magistrate
court).
24. Mo. R. Cv. P. 99.03 (circuit court); § 533.270, RSMo 1969 (magistrate
court).
25. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.02 (circuit court); § 533.270, RSMo 1969 (magistrate
court).
26. Mo. R. Crv. P. 99.04 (circuit court); § 533.310, RSMo 1969 (magistrate
court).
27. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.06 (circuit court); § 533.260, RSMo 1969 (magistrate
court).
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any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. ,, 8
This statement looms as one of the most majestic, yet fluid concepts in
our constitutional law. The interference with property rights occasioned
by the prejudgment remedies usually amounts to a "deprivation" of
property. In addition, these remedies typically are available merely upon
plaintiff's sworn allegations of certain facts. As a result, over the years
many of the prejudgment remedies have been attacked as violating the due
process clause.
Early courts were unconcerned about prejudgment seizures of prop-
erty, refusing to examine the "form" of a proceeding.20 The case of Owenby
v. Morgan3 O may have undermined this view, however. In Owenby, the Su-
preme Court upheld a Delaware foreign attachment statute in the face of
a due process attack. Speaking for the majority, Justice Pitney emphasized
that foreign attachment facilitated the obtaining of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion over a defendant who had absented himself from the state,8 1 thereby
indicating that the Court saw a countervailing interest that justified post-
ponement of due process. Language early in the opinion, however, sug-
gested that the Court might not even be concerned whether a countervail-
ing interest was present. The Court stated:
[T]he question reduces itself to whether this condition is an arbi-
trary and unreasonable requirement, so inconsistent with estab-
lished modes of administering justice that it amounts to a denial
of due process. And this must be determined ... with respect to
the general effect and operation of the system of procedure estab-
lished by the statutes.8 2
Thus, because attachments made pursuant to this statute came as part of a
total process wherein defendant could air his claim, the Court held the
procedure comported with due process.
Further evidence of this attitude appeared in Mclnnes v. McKay,8 3
where the Maine Supreme Court held a property attachment statute con-
stitutional under due process. This statutory scheme did not facilitate sub-
ject matter jurisdiction; it did little more than compel a local defendant's
appearance.8 4 The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a one-sentence
opinion,85 citing Owenby v. Morgan and another similar case.3 0 Thus, the
Court apparently considered a temporary deprivation of property as de
minimus so long as it remained part of an overall process providing for ul-
timate hearing and judgment.
The landmark decision of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. See Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Hurwitz v. North, 271
U.S. 40 (1926); Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
30. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
51. Id. at 110-11.
82. Id. at 108-04.
8. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
34. Id. at 118, 141 A. at 701.
35. McInnes v. McKay, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
86. Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
[Vol. 8
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Co.Y' further suggested that the Court considered the essence of due process
to be the ultimate protection of title rights. Mullane dealt with a statutory
common trust fund. Under the statutes, periodic accountings were required.
All beneficiaries were to be given notice of the accountings by publication.
A cause of action for a breach of trust occurring during a particular ac-
counting period was lost unless asserted in the accounting covering that
period.38 The Court decided the beneficiaries had what amounted to a
property interest that could be permanently impaired by an accounting
decree.3 9 In a famous opinion holding that the notice by publication was
insufficient under the due process clause, Justice Jackson stated that
[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reason-
ably calculated... to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their ob-jections.4 0
Thus, the Court indicated that a taking arises when there is either an ul-
timate deprivation of property or a binding determination of title rights.
By implication, a temporary deprivation would not rise to the level of a
taking.
Since Mullane, the courts have concerned themselves more with tem-
porary seizures of property, and in 1969 it became apparent that at least
some deprivations of property pending judgment violated procedural due
process. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,41 the Supreme Court held a
prejudgment garnishment made pursuant to a Wisconsin statute uncon-
stitutional. Justice Douglas emphasized the fluid nature of procedural due
process when he stated that "[a] procedural rule that may satisfy due proc-
ess for attachments in general.., does not necessarily satisfy procedural due
process in every case." 42 In rejecting the Mclnnes de minimus approach,
upon which the lower court had relied,43 Douglas maintained that even a
temporary prejudgment garnishment of wages violated due process, pri-
marily because of the importance of salary to the daily existence of the low
income garnishee-defendant.
Following Sniadach, there was a proliferation of case law concerning
similar alleged deprivations of property, including: Termination and re-
duction of welfare benefits; 44 distress for rent by a landlord;45 enforce-
37. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
38. Id. at 308-09.
39. Id. at 313.
40. Id. at 314 (emphasis added), citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1914);
Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900).
41. 595 U.S. 337 (1969).
42. Id. at 340.
43. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259(1967), rev'd, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
44. See Daniel v. Goliday, 398 U.S. 73 (1970); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397
U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
45. See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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ment of innkeepers' liens; 46 dismissal of civil service employees; 47 mortgage
foreclosures; 48 suspension of drivers' licenses; 49 prejudgment garnishment of
accounts receivable; 50 confessions of judgment; 51 and, finally, prejudgment
replevin. 52 The courts were divided on the propriety of extending the
principle of Sniadach beyond wages, which Douglas had remarked were a
"specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system." 53 Through 1971, the replevin statutes of California, Florida, Mary-
land, New York, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania were challenged as contra-
vening the principle of Sniadach.
The first decision to hold prejudgment replevin unconstitutional was
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co. 54 In that case, a federal district court
held that the New York statute violated due process insofar as it allowed
prejudgment seizure of daily necessity items, stating: "Beds, stoves, mat-
tresses .. .and other necessaries for ordinary day-to-day living are, like
wages in Sniadach, a specialized type of property...."5
The case of Fuentes v. Faircloth6 typified another view of the issue.
The court in Fuentes upheld prejudgment seizure of a gas stove and stereo
pursuant to Florida's replevin statute, even though a stove was one of
the items mentioned in Laprease as being a "necessar[y] of ordinary day-
to-day living."57 Likewise, in Epps v. Cortese5 S and Wheeler v. Adams Co.,50
two federal courts limited Sniadach to its facts by refusing to classify such
items as tables and beds as specialized property.
46. See Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
47. See Ricucci v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
48. See Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1808 (D.D.C. 1970), discussed in
Nelson, Deed of Trust Foreclosure Under Powers of Sale-Constitutional Prob-
lems-Legislative Alternatives, 28 J. Mo. B. 452 (1972).
49. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
50. See Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45 (1969). But see
Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969) (dictum).
51. See Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
52. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), rev'g Epps v. Cortese, 326 F.
Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), & Fuentes v. Faircloth, 817 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla.
1970); Brunswick Corp. v. J. Sc P. Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Wheeler v.
Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture
Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486
P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
53. 395 U.S. at 340.
54. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
55. Id. at 722-23. It is submitted that the uncertainty as to which items
should be classified as specialized property makes this approach unsatisfactory.
For example, while personal luxury items or most property subject to litigation
between commercial enterprises are probably outside the category established
in Laprease, a gray area would exist as to almost all property possessed by a
low-income family.
56. 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972).
57. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
58. 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
59. 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971).
[Vol. 38
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The case of Blair v. Pitchess60 presented the next major development.
Blair was a taxpayers' suit challenging all prejudgment replevin under an
1872 California claim and delivery law. Abandoning the specialized prop-
erty concept, the California Supreme Court held the statute unconstitu-
tional in its entirety. The court's sole basis for analogizing prejudgment
claim and delivery to prejudgment garnishment was that both involved a
taking of property prior to notice and opportunity for hearing.6 1 Under
the view represented by this decision, whenever persons are required to
settle their claims of right through the judicial process, they must be given
a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive them
of any significant property interest, except in an extraordinary situation.
In 1972 the Supreme Court met squarely with the prejudgment re-
plevin problem in the case of Fuentes v. Shevin,62 which was an appellate
consolidation of Fuentes v. Faircloth and Epps v. Cortese. In Shevin, the
Court struck down the replevin statutes of Pennsylvania and Florida on
due process grounds. In so doing, the Court put aside the specialized prop-
erty concept as a measure of the intensity of due process protection. It indi-
cated that a necessity of life need not be involved for due process to
require opportunity for hearing prior to a temporary deprivation of prop-
erty.0 3 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, believed that this attitude
was more in line with the mainstream of past cases, and that the Sniadach
holding was not geared purely to the absolute necessities of life. Stewart
gave some indication, however, that the importance of the property in-
terest to the individual is relevant to the form of notice and hearing to be
afforded. 64
Thus, the Supreme Court has handed down a definitive ruling that
notice and opportunity for hearing must normally precede any seizure in
replevin. In the wake of Shevin, the Missouri Supreme Court has also ruled
on Missouri replevin procedures. In Williams v. Berrey,65 the court held that
a prejudgment replevin order issued by a magistrate court failed to comport
with the due process standards in Shevin. Plaintiff filed his petition, exe-
cuted an affidavit praying for prejudgment delivery, and posted the ap-
propriate bond. Thereupon, a magistrate clerk issued an order for seizure
of the property described in the affidavit and petition. The property was
thereafter seized from defendant's residence prior to obtaining service of
process. While refusing to invalidate facially the prejudgment possession
portions of the statute, the court held the procedure unconstitutional as ap-
plied to defendant.66 Presumably, the procedure would be constitutional if
an extraordinary circumstance existed.
These decisions leave unanswered, however, at least two questions that
will confront future courts in ruling upon the validity of prejudgment re-
plevin. First, the Supreme Court's indication in Shevin that notice and op-
60. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
61. Id. at 278, 486 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
62. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
63. Id. at 89.
64. Id. at 89-90; see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
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portunity for hearing are not required in certain extraordinary circum-
stances 67 means that a court must determine whether such circumstances
existed. Second, if an extraordinary situation was not present, a court must
determine what constitutes an adequate opportunity to be heard.
In evaluating the first issue, a court must weigh governmental or pub-
lic interests favoring prompt action against the obvious due process man-
date. If a sufficient countervailing state-creditor interest is at stake, notice
and opportunity for hearing may be postponed until after the seizure.
Several countervailing governmental interests have been suggested in lower
court cases, but only a few of those were favorably received in Shevin's
dictum. Justice Stewart indicated that these situations must be truly un-
usual and that even then the state should strictly control its monopoly of
force. 68 The Court cited such examples as collection of federal taxes, seizures
to meet the needs of war, and protection against bank failure, misbranded
drugs, and contaminated food.69
Prejudgment seizure for the benefit of a secured creditor involves three
countervailing state-creditor interests arguably sufficient to constitute an
extraordinary condition. These interests are: (1) the necessity of prevent-
ing a defaulting vendee from absconding with property that is subject to
litigation;70 (2) the paramount importance to the expansion of consumer
credit of the ability of a defaulted vendor to gain speedy repossession of his
security;71 and (3) the possible necessity of seizure as a means of obtaining
jurisdiction.72
If the statute authorizing prejudgment seizure is narrowly drawn so as
to provide relief only when there is imminent danger the property may dis-
appear, the first interest might be strong enough to allow postponement of
notice and hearing. 73 Most statutes, however, are not so narrowly drawn.
For instance, the Missouri replevin procedure provides for a prejudgment
remedy only in the event plaintiff swears he will otherwise be in danger
of losing the property pending judgment. Yet the Missouri Supreme Court
recognized in Williams v. Berrey that affidavits for prejudgment seizure are
filed as a matter of course, with little, if any, consideration by either plain-
tiff or the court as to the truth of the allegations made therein. Further-
more, some courts view the vendor's fear of losing track of secured property
67. 407 U.S. at 90-91.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 92, citing Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594(1950) (misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 32 U.S. 245 (1947) (protec-
ton against bank failure); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (col-
lection of taxes); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921) (war effort needs);Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921) (war effort needs); Central Union Trust
Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (war effort needs); North Am. Storage Co.
v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated food).
70. See Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1971) rev'd sub
nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 279,
486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 56 (1971).
71. See Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645, 657 (D. Md. 1971); Blair
v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 280, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 57 (1971).
72. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 279-80, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 57 (1971).
73. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972).
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1978] PREJUDGMENT REPLEVIN 265
as an uncompelling consideration in light of the common creditor practice
of threatening a defaulting vendee with repossession long before any re-
plevin suit is filed. Any debtor intending to abscond with an item therefore
receives his cue long before service of the petition.7 4
Second, the need for continued expansion of consumer credit probably
fails to present an extraordinary condition. The suggestion has been made
that elimination of prejudgment replevin will raise financing charges on
conditional sales agreements because the ability to gain speedy repossession
is necessary to reduce overall expenses of selling.7 5 Yet, this ability may be
vital only to the "easy credit" merchants who do volume business with low-
income families.76 Since credit terms enable these merchants to charge
higher prices than those set by general credit retailers,77 expansion of
consumer credit to the poor under current conditions may be undesirable.
Further, lower economic groups have traditionally been most affected by
deceptive lending practices. In 1968, the Truth-in-Lending Act manifested
the strong legislative desire to curtail uninformed use of credit in order to
combat unconscionable creditor practices.78 Finally, growth of credit among
lower economic groups merely allows proliferation of high interest rates and
possibly unwise purchases. A recent Federal Trade Commission report re-
vealed that while general market retailers take legal action against de-
linquent customers only as a last resort, some "easy credit" retailers depend
on court action as a matter of course. 79 The report contained a survey of
practices by retailers in the District of Columbia, which indicated that in
one year some creditors averaged one judgment for every $2,559.00 of
sales.80 To the extent that prejudgment replevin remains an integral part
of low-income credit schemes, its elimination would aid in curtailing un-
just practices.
With regard to the third interest, the Court in Shevin indicated that
it considered the necessity of using prejudgment seizure to obtain juris-
diction sufficient to warrant postponement of the hearing. The Court re-
ferred to this factor as "dearly a most basic and important public inter-
est."81 Nevertheless, the presence of a liberal long arm statute may dilute
the significance of this interest. In Missouri, when the parties to a replevin
action have an underlying contractual relationship of local origin, the
74. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 279, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 56 (1971).
75. See Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645, 657 (D. Md. 1971).
76. See FTC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 76.
77. Id.
78. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970), provides:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and
the competition among the various financial institutions and other
firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strength-
ened by the informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results
from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of
this subchapter to assure that a meaningful disclosure of credit terms
so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
79. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 75-76.
80. Id. at 76.
81. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
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plaintiff may obtain personal service of process against the out-state de-
fendant,82 thus largely eliminating the need for quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, unless property subject to replevin against a foreign defendant
is seized or otherwise secured, he may abscond with the chattel pending
judgment, thus making satisfaction of a judgment economically impractical.
The second phase of the due process problem, i.e., what constitutes
adequate opportunity to be heard, was inadequately dealt with in Shevin.
The scope of hearing necessary to provide a meaningful opportunity to be
heard remains undear, possibly due to the many-faceted nature of due
process. The Court indicated the scope of hearing might vary according to
the type of interest involved,88 but that the nature and form of such hear-
ings were subjects for legislative, not judicial, determination.8 4 The most
specific enumeration yet given as to the requisite form of proceedings is
only that some type of hearing on the merits is necessary.85 The Missouri
court in Wililams v. Berrey specified "the judge must make a finding of
the probable validity of the plaintiff's underlying claim before issuing the
order of delivery,"86 which would also contemplate some consideration of
the merits at the preseizure hearing.
In passing, it should be noted that the concept of specialized property
and its accompanying evaluational problems87 have not been completely
escaped. Our legislators may also need to attack this problem in styling
the appropriate form of hearing.
B. Search and Seizure
The Supreme Court in Shevin did not decide whether fourth amend-
ment protection operates under prejudgment replevin, but stated that
satisfaction of due process hearing requirements might well obviate any
search and seizure problem.88 However, application of the fourth amend-
ment to prejudgment seizure may be important in "extraordinary situa-
tions" where notice and the opportunity to be heard is postponed until after
the taking.
In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,89 which
dealt with a warrant of distress against real property, the Supreme Court
enunciated the longstanding role that the fourth amendment does not ap-
ply to civil proceedings for the collection of debts.00 Two recent Supreme
Court holdings have eroded this rule, however. Camara v. Municipal
82. See § 506.240, RSMo 1969.
83. 407 U.S. at 91. As the property interest increases in importance to the
debtor, particularly where daily necessity items are involved, a more extensive
hearing may be required prior to seizure.
84. Id. at 97.
85. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 268, 486 P.2d 1242, 1248, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 48 (1971).
86. 492 S.W.2d at 736.
87. See note 55 supra.
88. 407 U.S. at 96 n.32. The Missouri court also avoided this issue in
Williams v. Berrey.
89. 59 U.S. 227 (1855).
90. Id. at 239.
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Court91 and See v. City of Seattle9 2 held that civil fire and health inspec-
tions are searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Yet, the
Court has refused to apply fourth amendment protections to all civil in-
trusions. For instance, in Wyman v. James,93 the Court held that the fourth
amendment does not apply to statutorily required home visitations by social
workers to ADC stipend recipients because such visitations do not rise to the
level of a search. The tone of the visitations provided the primary moti-
vation for the holding in Wyman. Justice Blackmun, for the majority,
elucidated that the caseworker's posture was more rehabilitative than in-
vestigative, and that no criminal sanctions were available for a refusal to
allow entrance. 94
Seizure by the sheriff in a replevin action probably rises to the level
of a constitutionally protected search and seizure. The tone of the in-
trusion is hostile, and a refusal of entry may be a criminal act.95 If the
fourth amendment applies in situations involving prejudgment replevin,
the sheriff must either obtain a warrant predicated on probable cause,9 6 or,
in situations where dispensation with the warrant is appropriate, make a
reasonable search for the chattel.97
An examination of civil warrant requirements reveals that their pro-
tection may be illusory. As expressed in Camara and See, the probable cause
standard in the civil area is marginal compared to that required in criminal
search and seizure. A mere valid public interest in enforcement of reason-
able health regulations through area-wide searches constitutes probable
cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.98 Furthermore, the Court
made dear the inspector need not demonstrate a definite indication of any
violation within the premises to be searched.99
That the Court may also contemplate such a marginal probable cause
standard for a search and seizure in a replevin action is indicated by its
assumption in Shevin that fulfillment of due process notice and hearing
requirements will obviate any search and seizure issue. In Blair v. Pitchess,0 0
the California Supreme Court fashioned a more precise standard of prob-
able cause. An injunction granted in that case prohibited the sheriff from
making any replevin search prior to establishing, before a magistrate, prob-
able cause to believe: (1) That the property to be replevied is located in
the area to be searched; and (2) that plaintiff has a right to immediate
possession. The latter requirement means that the magistrate must be given
sufficient facts to suggest the truth of the allegations in the complaint.101
91. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see James v. Goldberg 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
92. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
93. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
94. Id. at 325.
95. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.18.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 2.
97. Id. § 1.
98. Camara v. Munidpal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
99. Id.
100. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
101. 5 Cal. 3d at 274, 486 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
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Thus, an uncertainty exists as to what, if any, probable cause standard
applies in replevin.
The problem of what constitutes probable cause in a replevin action
may never arise, however, because a warrant may never be required for a
search and seizure in a replevin action. The companion to the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment is the reasonableness test for warrantless
searches. Some countervailing governmental interest is necessary to allow
dispensation with a warrant. For example, in the criminal area, searches of
moving vehicles,102 hot-pursuit searches, 03 and streetside pat-downs 0 4 all
present instances where such a countervailing interest exists. The courts
have resorted to a balancing process to determine the reasonableness of
civil intrusions;1 05 with regard to replevin, they have used the same ele-
ments as those evaluated previously under the due process issue.100 There-
fore, any extraordinary circumstance justifying postponement of notice and
hearing may also justify dispensation with a warrant. If so, and if the
notice and hearing required in the absence of extraordinary circumstances
obviate the warrant requirement, 107 a search warrant would never be re-
quired in a replevin action.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A. Non-Judicial Repossessions
Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code sanctions self-help
repossession by a secured creditor upon default by the vendee, provided the
secured party avoids breach of peace in his actions.' 08 In addition, most
installment sales contracts include, with varying precision, these provisions
of the code.'0 9 At first glance, section 9-503 appears to provide an easy means
of circumventing the notice and hearing requirements in replevin. Neverthe-
less, several problems may limit the utility of self-help as a remedy.
The creditor and his agent must guard against possible breach of the
peace in making repossession." 0 Courts have held the right to breach the
102. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
103. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
104. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
105. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
106. See text accompanying notes 64-80 supra.
107. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 n.32 (1972); text accompanying
note 88 supra.
108. UNIFoRm Co1' .l CacAL CODE § 9-503 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to
take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party
may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach
of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so pro-
vides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble the col-
lateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be
designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both
parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment un-
usable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under
Section 9-504.
109. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 282, 486 P.2d 1242, 1258-59, 96 Cal.
Reptr. 42, 58 (1971).
110. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503.
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peace is not necessary for protection of the secured party's investment"1 ' A
contractual provision authorizing the creditor to breach the peace is likely
to be void.1 12 Breach of peace in repossession may result in tort liability for
trespass (including punitive damages), 1 3 statutory liability under section
9-507 of the UCC,"34 or loss of the right to a deficiency judgment.115
Two factors are crucial in defining acts that constitute a breach: (1)
Whether there is entry into the debtor's home; and (2) whether contempo-
raneous consent is obtained. 1 6 Relatively few breach of peace problems arise
when the vendor repossesses property outside the debtor's dwelling, as when
a car is taken from the driveway."17 The issue of consent becomes crucial,
however, whenever an entrance into the home is necessary."18 Fraud in
gaining admission to the debtor's premises negates any free and contempo-
raneous consent. 11 9 In addition, some question exists as to when a third
party may give consent for the debtor. The validity of third party consent
hinges on the consenter's authority to speak for the debtor, as well as his age
and familial relationship to the debtor.120
Case law is divided on whether entry in the debtor's absence constitutes
a breach of peace.12 ' The cases are also split on whether entry in the face of
a mere oral protest against repossession constitutes a breach of peace. 2 2
These uncertainties render self-help less attractive as a remedy.
111. See, e.g., Hileman v. Harter Bank &c Trust Co., 174 Ohio St. 95, 186
N.E.2d 853 (1962).
112. Id.
113. See Kensinger Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 223 Ark. 942, 269 S.W.2d
792 (1954); Jones v. H. Martini Furnishing Co., 77 Mo. App. 474 (St. L. Ct. App.
1898); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wiener, 405 P.2d 691 (Okla. 1965). See also Annots.,
99 A.L.R.2d 358 (1965), 35 A.L.R.3d, 1016 (1971).
114. U riomi Conm ERCiL CODE § 9-507 provides in part:
[T]he debtor ... has a right to recover from the secured party any loss
caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part. If the
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any
event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten per
cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential
plus ten per cent of the cash price.
115. See White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in Reposses-
sions, Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3 U.C.C.L.J. 199 (1971).
116. Id. at 200.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Rhodes-Carroll Furniture Co. v. Webb, 230 Ala. 251, 160 So. 247(1935); Barham v. Standridge, 201 Ark. 1143, 148 S.W.2d 648 (1941). But see
North v. Williams, 120 Pa. 109, 13 A. 723 (1888).
120. See, e.g., Bing v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 237 F. Supp. 911(E.D.S.C. 1965) (sister of debtor could consent); Luthy v. Philip Werlein Co.,
163 La. 752, 112 So. 709 (1927) (daughter of debtor could not consent); Austin
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 239 Miss. 699, 125 So. 2d 79 (1960) (wife
of debtor could consent).
121. Breach: Girard v. Anderson, 219 Ia. 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934); Davis
v. Nash Cent. Motors, 332 S.W.2d 475 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960); Hileman v. Har-
ter Bank Sc Trust Co., 174 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E.2d 853 (1962). No breach:
Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1968).
122. Oral protest sufficient: Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976,
341 S.W.2d 765 (1961); Baber Elec. Co. v. Greer, 183 Okla. 541, 83 P.2d 598(1938); Lark v. Cooper Furniture Co., 114 S.C. 37, 102 S.E. 786 (1920); Mor-
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The UCO sanctions repossession of the security only upon default by
the vendee,123 but problems arise concerning the meaning of default. Article
9 of the UCC fails to define this term; scholars loosely define it as a failure
by the debtor to perform his legal or contractual obligation.12 4 To resolve
this uncertainty, the parties often clearly delineate default in the financing
agreement. 2 5 However, because most consumer credit contracts are adhesive,
there may be some limits in defining default within the sales agreement. 120
If the definition of default is unconscionable under section 2-802,127 the
provision may be unenforceable. However, the courts have yet to label un-
conscionable a provision allowing repossession upon any default in payment.
Recent case law developments to the effect that self-help by the vendor
may constitute state action add another element of uncertainty to the use of
this remedy. The due process clause governs only deprivations of property
by the state;'28 it does not govern actions by a private individual. How-
ever, the doctrine of state action expands the reach of the due process clause
to certain activities of private individuals.' 20 The point where activities by
a private person become state action is unclear under the cases, partly be-
cause most state action litigation has involved the equal protection clause
and racial segregation problems.'8 0 It is difficult to determine the extent
to which the result orientation in the area of racial desegregation has affect-
ed the decisions in these cases.
Plaintiffs in several lower federal courts have litigated the state action
issue in suits involving self-help creditor's remedies.' 81 In these cases, the
chief issue is whether actions by a creditor are conducted under "color" of
state law,'8 2 i.e., pursuant to a delegation of duties normally reserved to
rison v. Gaylon Motor Co., 16 Tenn. App. 394, 64 S.W.2d 851 (1932) (dictum).
Oral protest insufficient: Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 1 So. 2d
776 (1941); Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 64 S.E. 410 (1909); Singer Mfg. Co.
v. Rios, 96 Tex. 174, 71 S.W. 275 (1903).
123. See statute quoted note 106 supra.
124. See Squillante, Commercial Code Review: A Summary of Leading De-
cisions & Articles, 74 Com. L.J. 17 (1969).
125. Id.
126. See Comment, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Tr.MP.
L.Q. 125, 127 (1962).
127. UNIFOMu COMAIERCAL CODE § 2-302 provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clauses, or it may limit the ap-
plication of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. See Horan, Law & Social Change: The Dynamics of the "State Action"
Doctrine, 17 J. PuB. L. 258 (1968).
130. Id.
131. See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Oller v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614
(S.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); I(lim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
132. State action roughly equates with the concept of "color of state law" con-
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government or judicial process. 133 Arguably, any action sanctioned by state
statute could meet this test. On the other hand, practically all statutory pro-
visions control human relationships in some manner.13 4 Thus, it is impracti-
cal to say that all human behavior conforming to statutory requirements
is state action. Nevertheless, activity sanctioned, and possibly encouraged,
by local statutes more nearly approaches state action than activity made pos-
sible solely by private agreement.
In Hall v. Garson,33 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined a
Texas statute that gave a landlord a lien on his tenants' personal property
and allowed peremptory seizure without judicial process.' 3 6 In holding that
such a seizure constituted state action, the court noted that this amounted
to the execution of a lien, which is traditionally the function of the sheriff or
constable.' 3 7 Similarly, in Klim v. Jones,38 a federal district court held
that seizure pursuant to a statutory self-help innkeepers' lien constituted
state action, noting that explicit state authorization was all that made it
possible.3 9 In accordance with these cases, a federal district court in Cali-
fornia recently held that self-help repossession under UCC section 9-503
constituted state action, to which all the notice and hearing requirements
of Shevin would apply. In Adams v. Egley,140 the court found state action
from the mere enactment of this code section because the enactors had set
forth a positive state policy.' 4 ' Conceivably, section 9-503 delegates rights
normally obtainable only in replevin or attachment.
Several other cases have taken a different position. For example, in the
case of Young v. Ridley,1 42 the court held that a non-judicial power of
sale under a deed of trust was bargained for by the parties at the time
of the mortgage agreement.' 43 While the court did not discuss the state ac-
tion issue specifically, it appears the element of private bargain between the
parties negated the existence of state action. Further, in McCormick v. First
National Bank,'44 a Florida federal district court held that non-judicial
repossessions under section 9-503 failed to constitute state action, stating that
the remedy was a product of a private contract between the parties and
that the mere presence of the Code as a backdrop to the transaction failed
tained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941),
the Supreme Court stated:
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action
"under color of" state law (emphasis added).
133. See W. LocniART, Y. KAi isAR, &e J. CHOFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES
-CoM ENTs-QuETMONS 1237-64 (3d. ed. 1970).
134. See Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
135. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
136. Id. at 432-33.
137. Id. at 439.
138. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
139. Id. at 114.
140. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
141. Id. at 618.
142. 303 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
143. Id. at 1312.
144. 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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to show a lack of independent bargaining. 4' Also, in Oiler v. Bank of
America, 46 the court held that the self-help remedy under the UCC was
purely contractual in origin. This case criticized the court in Adams v. Egley
for relying on state action law developed in civil rights litigation.147
The most recent ruling on section 9-503 has come from the New Jersey
courts. In Messenger v. Sandy Motors Inc.,148 the court noted that reposses-
sion on default had been a recognized practice long before adoption of the
UCC.149 The court believed that the mere codification of a time-honored
common law right could not clothe the practice of self-help with color of
state law, so as to take it out of the private area and subject it to due
process scrutiny.150
This split of authority on the status of section 9-503, particularly in
light of the division in the federal circuits, increases the probability of
a future Supreme Court ruling to settle the controversy. However, it is
noteworthy that a ruling to the effect that self-help constitutes state ac-
tion, because section 9-503 exists as a backdrop to the practice, may not
eliminate these activities. If sanction by the UCC is necessary to provide
the state action taint to helf-help, repeal of section 9-503 might eliminate
any state action argument.
B. Equitable Replevin
In lieu of legal replevin under rule 99, the creditor may be able to
obtain an equitable remedy if he can demonstrate that the remedy at
law is inadequate. An advantageous feature of equitable replevin is the
ability of the court to issue a temporary mandatory injunction to compel
return of the chattel to plaintiff pending trial. Likewise, the court has
the option to issue a temporary prohibitive injunction or a temporary
restraining order that defendant not disturb, damage, or dispose of the
chattel before disposition of the case.' 5 ' One or both of these alternatives
may provide a solution to the notice and hearing requirements in Shevin
in that in both situations a right to a hearing on the temporary relief
normally exists.
In lawsuits involving chattels, the prevalent attitude is that the remedy
at law is presumptively adequate.5 2 Many chattels possess a degree of fungi.
bility, since a reasonable facsimile to the chattel can be located and pur-
chased with the proceeds of a judgment. Exceptions to the presumption of
legal adequacy exist, however, where personalty sought to be replevied
145. Id. at 606-07.
146. 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
147. Id. at 23.
148. 295 A.2d 402 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1972).
149. Id. at 405-06.
150. Id. at 406. Another interesting aspect of this decision is the conclusion,
drawn from several sources, that self-help is far more prevalent than replevin as a
summary remedy in automobile financing. See id. at 407-08.
151. See Van Hecke, Equitable Replevin, 33 N.C.L.R. 57 (1954). See also
D. DOBBs, RE FDiEs § 5.13 at 400 (1973); IA Mo. PRA'ICE Siuzs § 1211, at 352
(1966).
152. See H. McCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES oF EQurrY § 107 (2d ed. 1948).
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possesses a uniqueness to the plaintiff, either because of its intrinsic or aes-
thetic value,153 or because of peculiar market conditions. 154
With respect to the unique chattel, as opposed to the fungible chattel,
rule 99 may be an inadequate legal remedy for two reasons. First, where
the defendant can rebond and retain the property pending final judgment,
he has the power to use up or wear out the chattel. Second, it is not entirely
clear that rule 99 orders for delivery of a chattel, either pre-trial or after
final judgment, are enforceable under the contempt power. Thus, it may
be possible for a defendant to secrete, alienate, or destroy a chattel and
ultimately be answerable only in money damages. These inadequacies would
exist even if rule 99 provided for pre-trial notice and hearing.
Rule 99.01 implies that the court may either prescribe a prejudgment
seizure or "otherwise secure" the property.15 5 This language arguably indi-
cates that the legislature and Rules Committee intended to vest blanket
power in the courts to issue an equitable in personam order in any Missouri
replevin action. Still, it remains unclear whether rule 99.01 confers equitable
powers on the courts. One authority takes the position that no such powers
exist because a prejudgment order is not enforceable by contempt,' 56
despite the fact that rule 99.17 provides for enforcement "as other orders
of court are enforced."57
A prohibitive order requiring that defendant preserve the chattel pend-
ing trial would comply with the Shevin due process formula insofar as
defendant would retain possession pending trial. It is perhaps less dear,
however, whether the court could constitutionally issue a mandatory
temporary injunction requiring delivery of the chattel to plaintiff pending
the outcome on the merits. Temporary injunctions typically involve an
adversary hearing prior to issuance. 58 Moreover, the court usually makes
a preliminary estimate about the ultimate merits in determining whether
to issue the in personam order.159 Consequently, since the hearing on the
temporary injunction would entail consideration of the merits, it would
arguably comport with due process requirements.
C. Waiver of Constitutional Rights
The question of the feasibility of using a waiver of constitutional rights
in the sales contract or financing statement is extremely important to the
creditor seeking prejudgment repossession. If a waiver can be achieved, the
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.01.
156. See Volz, Logan, Blackmar, Rowland, & Hilpert, Replevin, IA Mo. PRAc-
TIcE SmluEs § 1211, at 352 (1966), where the authors suggest:
The action is one at law rather than in equity. It does not insure the
specific recovery of the property, and the defendant cannot be compelled
under pain of contempt to reveal the location of the property or to re-
frain from concealing it. Consequently the action has its limitations, and
if unavoidable harm will result. . . it may be necessary to proceed by a
separate action in equity rather than by replevin .... Temporary orders
to restrain the alienation or concealment of the property might be asked.
157. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.18.
158. See D. DOBBs, REMEDIES § 5.13, at 402 (1973).
159. Id. at 403.
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creditor avoids any due process notice and hearing requirements in both
the replevin and self-help areas.160 Again, however, it is important to note
the fluid nature of due process, which is likely to affect any attempt to create
a waiver of rights.
In criminal procedure case law, a basic requirement for waiver of consti-
tutional rights is a voluntary, knowledgeable, and intelligent relinquish-
ment.161 Moreover, there is a presumption against waiver. 162 While the cases
have yet to decide whether the standard for waiver is the same in both civil
and criminal matters,1 63 at least one difference may exist between the two.
Any waiver of rights from a suspected criminal must be reasonably con-
temporaneous with the activity to which the waiver applies. 16 4 It is sub-
mitted that such spontaneity need not exist where a property right in the
civil area is involved. 165
Whatever the degree of spontaneity required, it is clear that any waiver
of constitutional rights must dearly be indicated as such. 06 In other words,
the contractual language relied upon must amount to a waiver on its face.
This requirement gives rise to several practical problems for the creditor.
For instance, a contractual provision that grants the seller a mere right to
repossession on default may not serve as a waiver of rights to the sheriff in
replevin. 67 Further, a repossession sanctioned by the waiver might result in
the taking of some property not specified as collateral in the security agree-
ment,168 as where the property seized is a vehicle having extraneous items
stored inside.' 69 Cautious action and careful draftmanship will be necessary
in order to avoid these pitfalls.
Regardless of the constitutional standard for waiver of rights in civil
litigation, difficulties in effecting a waiver may vary according to the relative
strengths of the parties involved. When two parties bargain on equal foot-
ing, they may easily bargain for the relinquishment of a known right.17 0
Thus, when two commercial entities negotiate a sales contract containing a
160. In the context of a sale of goods on credit, one usually thinks of the
buyer as the party who waives his rights. In at least one situation, however, the
buyer can obtain replevin from the seller. UNIFOM COMAMRCIAL CODE § 2-716
provides:
The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if
after a reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the
circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing ....
Consequently, the buyer may want to obtain a waiver of the seller's due process
rights where he anticipates he will be unable to cover in the event of breach.
161. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
162. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
163. See D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
164. See, e.g., State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418 (Me. 1967). In that case, the
defendant waived his fourth amendment rights by consenting to a search of his
house. The court held that this waiver did not survive defendant's arrest and that
therefore a search of his house the following day violated his fourth amendment
rights.
165. See D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
166. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972).
167. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
168. See Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 621 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
169. Id.
170. See D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
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waiver of due process, it probably should be given effect. Consumer con-
tracts are by nature adhesionary,171 however, and nearly all contain some
type of purported waiver. 172 The consumer cannot shop for more favorable
terms. Thus, a waiver of notice and hearing may fail to rise to the level
of a knowledgeable, intelligent relinquishment. It would be unrealistic,
however, to assume that no waiver of rights is possible in a consumer
credit transaction.
The difficulty in obtaining a waiver of rights is analogous to that
encountered in drafting a valid disclaimer of implied warranties in a sales
contract. Section 2-316 of the UCC sanctions disdaimers'7 3 only when made
conspicuous.17 4 Moreover, certain specified words must be used in some
cases.' 75 A number of cases have even dictated that public policy militates
against any disclaimer of implied warranties of merchantability or fit-
ness.
1 76
The Shevin Court hedged a discussion of the waiver issue, find-
ing no language in the sales contract that could rise to the level of a
relinquishment of constitutional rights.177 The Court said the lan-
guage simply lacked the necessary clarity. However, in D.H. Overmeyer
Co. v. Frick,178 the Supreme Court, in examining a due process waiver in
a judgment note, hinted that it would be difficult to find a waiver of con-
stitutional rights in any contract of adhesion. At this time, however, the
waiver issue remains unresolved.
VI. RExORM LEGISLATION
The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated that Missouri codi-
fied replevin is due for a change,' 79 to the extent that the opportunity
for some type of adversary hearing must ordinarily precede a judicial
order for prejudgment delivery. As mentioned earlier, the court must
give defendant adequate notice and the opportunity for a hearing at which
171. This stems from the vendor's need to be able to plan his risks in an orderly
fashion. Adhesion contracts enable the seller to engage in transactions that would
be profitless if a new agreement were composed for each transaction. In addition,
standard form agreements allow automation in processing and filing, which result
in great savings to the vendor and a cheaper bargain for the vendee. Reasonably
consistent judicial interpretation of such contracts constitutes a further advantage.
Yet their use also results in a widespread disparity in the bargaining power of
the parties, and in some cases may lead to overreaching by the vendor. Comment,
supra note 124, at 127-28 & 130-31.
172. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
173. UNIFORm CoiMm ECIAL CoDE § 2-316.
174. See U omur COmamciAL CODE § 2-317.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). But see Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140
(1967).
177. 407 U.S. at 95.
178. 450 U.S. 174 (1972). But see Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946),
where the court upheld a waiver of fourth amendment rights by a government
contractor. Business dealings between private enterprises and the government
would appear to produce adhesionary contracts.
179. See Williams v. Berrey, 429 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
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a judge determines at least the probable validity of plaintiff's underlying
claim.1 80 The legislature will undoubtedly review varied approaches for
aligning out statute and rules with the recent pronouncements in Shevin
and Williams. In the interim, tribunals must individually fashion pro-
cedures to comport with these directions.
There are several possible approaches to statutory revision. In New
York, the legislature has placed the burden of reform on the courts by
adopting a provision to the effect that to obtain a prejudgment remedy
a plaintiff must allege in his affidavit "facts sufficient under the due
process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the consti-
tution of the United States to authorize inclusion of the order of such
a provision."''1 While this may be a typical approach to reform legis-
lation, it leaves much to be desired, since reform must proceed on a
case-by-case basis.
It is submitted that there are numerous ways in which the Missouri
statutes or court rules can be revised to comply with the recent mandates.
First, replevin procedures might be made similar to those governing
attachment. Prior to the ruling in Williams v. Berrey, one author sug-
gested our statutes and rules were constitutional because the allegations
required in plaintiff's affidavit were equivalent to those required for
attachment. 8 2 Since the Court in Shevin noted that attachment consti-
tutes an extraordinary situation requiring postponement of notice and
hearing until after the seizure, the position was tenable. The two pro-
cedures are only comparable, however, insofar as there is a similarity in
the allegations required for relief. Traditionally, a wrongful attachment
is redressable through civil tort liability, including punitive damages.18s
Because prejudgment seizure in replevin does not amount to a levy, re-
plevin does not offer the same protection to defendant. Furthermore,
affidavits in replevin are typically filed without any consideration by
plaintiff or the court of the truth of the allegations therein.' 84 The super-
ficial similarity between replevin and attachment could be coupled with
a narrow reading of Williams so as to theorize the legality of our local
procedures; yet realistically our present replevin provisions do not pass
constitutional muster. Replevin could be made more emulatory of attach-
ment by providing for civil redress in cases where plaintiff makes false
180. Id. at 736.
181. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAw § 7102 (McKinney 1971). The amendment further
provides:
Upon presentation of the affidavit and undertaking and upon such terms
as may be required to conform to the due process of law requirements of
the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, the
court shall grant an order directing the sheriff to ... enter and search for
the chattel in the place where the chattel may be.
182. See Vetter, The Flag, 28 J. Mo. B. 865 (1972); Comment, Missouri's "Re.
plevin in Magistrate Courts": Some Constitutional Considerations, 15 ST. L.U.LJ.
596, 605 (1971).
183. See Miller v. Smith, 1 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1924); Powell v. Schultz, 118
S.W.2d 25 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938) (court indicated wrongful attachment exists
when there is no probable cause to believe the allegations in plaintiff's affidavit).
184. Williams v. Berrey, 429 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
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allegations in his affidavit. In most replevin cases, however, this approach
would eliminate any chance for prejudgment seizure.
In some cases it would be possible to speed up the hearing andjudgment process, as has been done in cases of forcible entry and un-
lawful detainer, where the defendant can be required to appear within
five days.185 However, because of overloaded dockets in circuit courts,
this approach may be tenable only in magistrate courts.
Preservation of the prejudgment remedy will require the styling of
an appropriate form of preseizure hearing. In devising a scheme to
comply with Shevin and Williams it will be important to insure due
consideration of plaintiff's underlying claim, as well as a preliminary ex-
amination of any purported defenses. "This scope of hearing would
appear to comply with due process requirements. Extraordinary circum-
stances, as defined by case law, could facilitate ex parte orders for pre-
judgment delivery.
Assuming that revision of the statutes or rules is imminent, it would
also be worthwhile to insure that prejudgment replevin procedures com-
port with possible fourth amendment requirements. 186 In this respect it
should be noted that the Supreme Court merely speculated that fulfill-
ment of due process requirements obviated the search and seizure ques-
tion. This dicta may prove unreliable in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
The aspects of consumer protection efforts discussed in this com-
ment represent a legal victory for advocates of consumer reform. While
it has been noted that the aim of these efforts has been largely to secure
protection of the poor, the recent cases have not been so limited as to
protect only the low-income consumer. Thus, the principles in Shevin
and its progeny will be important, not only in the legal aid office, but
also in dealings between commercial entities.
Some skeptics reason that imposition of a prima facie hearing re-
quirement in prejudgment replevin will do little to discourage atrocities
in creditor practices.18 7 It is suggested that waiver or self-help will en-
able the creditor to circumvent the hearing requirements in replevin,
or that in any event the consumer will suffer through higher financing
charges. The validity of these indictments remains unsettled, however.
Waiver of a consumer's rights may be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve
in a standard form contract. Likewise, self-help may be vested with the
same hearing requirements as replevin. Concerning increased costs, the
hearing requirement may have little overall effect on marketwide finance
charges, because only a small segment of the consumer credit industry
relies on prejudgment replevin as a normal order of business. Moreover,
an informal hearing conducted on five or six days notice would not
significantly add to the expense of maintaining a replevin suit.
The law decided in Shevin does not provide a panacea for con-
185. § 534.090, RSMo 1969.
186. See pt. IV, § B of this comment.
187. See Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
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sumer protection, but it does provide an important step in an emerging
area of the law. As future litigation unfolds, one hopes that it will be-
come apparent that Shevin dealt with more than just "ideological tinker-
ing." 8s
STEPHEN G. SCHOLL
188. 407 U.S. at 102.
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